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Introduction 
International migration has emerged one of the key political issues of the past fifty years and has thus been the sub-
ject of a vast amount of academic research, with the causes and consequences of migration in respect of the sending 
and receiving states and, to a lesser extent, migrants themselves the subject of countless articles, books and reports. 
While the gendering of migration has been studied since the early 1990s1, queer migration has only recently piqued 
academic interest. Nevertheless, a small but growing literature on migration by sexual minorities has emerged, com-
prising theoretical analyses of the relationship between migration and sexuality2; studies of rural-to-urban domestic 
migration3; border crossing by lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans* and queer (LGBTQ) migrants and the legal hurdles they 
have to overcome4; the (re)construction of sexual identities following migration5; and the emergence and lived expe-
                                                 
1  See, for example, William T. Bielby and Denise D. Bielby, “I Will Follow Him: Family Ties, Gender-Role Beliefs, and Reluctance 
to Relocate for a Better Job,” American Journal of Sociology, 97 (1992), 1241-1267; Gina Bujis, Migrant Women Crossing 
Boundaries and Changing Identities (Oxford: Berg, 1993); Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, Gendered Transitions: Mexican Expe-
riences of Immigration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). 
2  Jon Binnie, “Invisible Europeans: sexual citizenship in the New Europe,” Environment and Planning A, 29 (1997), 237-248; 
Nicola Mai and Russell King, “Love, sexuality and migration: mapping the issues,” Mobilities, 4 (2009), 295-307; Martin F. 
Manalansan, “Queer intersections: sexuality and gender in Migration Studies,” International Migration Review, 40 (2006), 
224-249. 
3  Andrew Gorman-Murray, “Intimate mobilities: emotional embodiment and queer migration,” Social and Cultural Geography, 
10 (2009), 441-60; Andrew Gorman-Murray, “Rethinking queer migration through the body,” Social and Cultural Geography, 
8 (2007), 105-121. 
4  Lionel Cantu Jr., The Sexuality of Migration: Border Crossings and Mexican Immigrant Men (New York: New York University 
Press, 2009); Eithne Luibhéid, “Sexuality, migration and the shifting line between legal and illegal status,” GLQ: A Journal of 
Lesbian and Gay Studies, 14 (2008), 289-315; Eithne Luibheid, Entry Denied: Controlling Sexuality at the Border (Minneapolis, 
MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2002); Eithne Luibheid and Lionel Cantu Jnr, eds, Queer Migrations: Sexuality, U.S. Citi-
zenship, and Border Crossings (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2005). 
5  Adi Kuntsman, Figurations of Violence and Belonging: Queerness, Migranthood and Nationalism in Cyberspace and Beyond 
(Oxford: Peter Lang, 2009). 
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rience of ‘queer diasporas’.6 In geographical terms, however, this work focuses primarily on the United States, with 
some attention also paid to Asian and Latin American societies as sending countries. Far less research has been con-
ducted on migration by LGBTQ individuals to or within Europe. This is surprising given the disparities in attitudes to-
wards and the degree of legal protection for LGBTQ people across Europe and thus the extent to which differences 
in said attitudes and rights could potentially act as push or pull factors in sending and receiving states, respectively.7  
Against this backdrop the aim of the article is to examine migration by LGBQ8 individuals from Russia and other post-
Soviet states to the German capital of Berlin, with a view to exploring their motivations for migrating, choice of des-
tination, integration strategies and relations with the Russian-speaking ethno-cultural diaspora, assessing the extent 
to which each of these processes was and is influenced by sexuality. The article also examines the potential benefit 
of using ‘queer diaspora’ as a heuristic device to think about identity, belonging and solidarity among sexual minori-
ties in the context of dispersal and transnational networks.9  
Following a brief explication of my methods and a theoretical discussion of migration and diaspora, I examine how 
homosexuality has been constructed in post-Soviet Russia, with a view to gaining a sense of the social environment 
in which the interview respondents, on the basis of whose lived experiences the analysis is based, grew up, and also 
to understanding why attitudes towards sexual minorities have become more negative in recent years. This section 
will be followed by an analysis of the migration and integration strategies of Russian-speaking LGBQ migrants in Ber-
lin, examining the role of both the ethno-cultural and queer diasporas.  
 
                                                 
6  David Eng, “Out here and over there: queerness and diaspora in Asian American studies,” Social Text, 15 (1997), 31-52; Si-
mon Watney, “AIDS and the politics of queer diaspora,” in Negotiating Lesbian and Gay Subjects, eds Monica Dorenkamp 
and Richard Henke, 53-70 (New York and Abingdon: Routledge, 1995); Martin F. Manalansan, Global Divas: Filipino Gay Men 
in the Diaspora (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003). 
7  For information on legal equality for LGBTI citizens in Europe in 2015, see the ILGA-Europe Rainbow map: http://www.ilga-
europe.org/sites/default/files/Attachments/side_a_rainbow_europe_map_2015_a3_no_crops.pdf (accessed 10 May 2015). 
8  As my aim is to examine the relationship between migration and sexuality, I will focus on LGBQ migrants given that trans* is 
a gender and not a sexual identity. I also acknowledge that the terms ‘lesbian’, ‘gay’, ‘bisexual’ and ‘queer’ are not universal-
ly accepted or understood in the Russian context, with other terms, such as goluboy or tema often used instead. I am thus 
using ‘lesbian’, ‘gay’, ‘bisexual’ and ‘queer’ as categories of analysis, rather than assuming they are categories of practice. 
9  Anne-Marie Fortier, “Queer diaspora,” in Handbook of Gay and Lesbian Studies, eds Diane Richardson and Steven Seidman, 
183-197 (London: Sage, 2002), quotation on 184. 
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Methodology 
The qualitative research upon which this article is based is drawn from a larger project conducted in 2012-2014 on 
LGBT migration from Eastern Europe and Latin America to London and Berlin. Eligible respondents for the specific 
research on which this article is based were literate men and women aged eighteen years or over who self-identified 
as non-heterosexual migrants from Russia or one of the post-Soviet states and whose native language was Russian. 
The sample was recruited through dating and community websites on the Internet, community venues and through 
snowballing. Informed consent was sought using information sheets in Russian, English and German. In total, 21 in-
depth interviews were conducted with Russian-speakers in Berlin. The interviewees were aged between 21 and 36; 
10 were men and 11 were women. The interviews were carried out in Russian, English or German depending on the 
preference of the interviewee, took place in a university office and lasted, on average, 45-50 minutes. Participants 
were offered EUR 25 as an incentive. Purposive sampling was used for the interviews to ensure a gender balance but 
the sample does not otherwise claim to be representative. The interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. 
Data management and analysis were facilitated by the use of the qualitative software N-Vivo. The verbatim data was 
coded and ordered within a thematic matrix, which emerged both from reviewing extant literature and the interview 
data itself. N-Vivo helped to identify key themes in the respondents’ narratives, around which the article has been 
structured: growing up LGBQ in their home countries, relationships with friends and family, social attitudes towards 
homosexuality, the decision to migrate and choice of destination, their relationships with members of their ethnic 
communities in Germany and with their families and friends at home, their national identities and their lives as LGBQ 
in the destination society. Participant observation (subsequently, observer participation) was also conducted over a 
period of six months at the fortnightly meetings, social gatherings and activist events of Quarteera, an association of 
LGBT Russian-speakers and their friends. As a result of my attending the Quarteera meetings, I became friends with 
a number of its members. Being granted access to their private spheres allowed me to gain greater insight into their 
day-to-day lives as LGBQ migrants. In the article, pseudonyms have been used to protect participants’ identities.  
 
Queering migration and diaspora 
The term ‘queer’, when discussed with reference to individual subjects, is used here as an alternative for ‘lesbian’, 
‘gay’ and ‘bisexual’ to reflect the fact that the latter Western terms were not adopted by all the migrants whom I 
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interviewed.10 It is noteworthy that the very idea of ‘queer’ was to a significant extent brought about by migration in 
that the mass movement of people to the West from various non-Western cultures brought into sharp relief the 
numerous ‘sexual identity categories and practices that [did] not depend on Western conceptions of selfhood and 
community’, thereby producing a range of queer identities and subjectivities.11 With reference to queer migration 
and queer diaspora, ‘queer’ is used in part to take account of the queer subjects of the processes of migration and 
diaspora but also to refer to the ways in which the presence of non-heterosexuals problematises hegemonic under-
standings of migration and diaspora.12 
The hegemonic understanding of migration sees the main motivation as being economic, with individuals moving 
abroad to gain higher wages or acquire marketable skills.13 Research into migration by LGBQ individuals, however, 
while not discounting the economic motivation entirely, shows that factors relating specifically to sexuality play an 
equally if not more important role in prompting them to relocate. In his ground-breaking study of queer migration 
within Australia, Andrew Gorman-Murray identifies three patterns of and motivations for ‘queer migration’, which 
he relates exclusively to cases where ‘the needs or desires of non-heterosexual identities, practices and performanc-
es’ are implicated in the queer migrant’s decision to move.14 The first is ‘coming-out migration’, whereby LGBT indi-
viduals move for the purpose of ‘self reinvention as non-heterosexual and to explore bodily sexual desires in the 
process’; the second is ‘gravitational group migration’, i.e. ‘moving to be near a neighbourhood with a gay and lesbi-
an presence’; the third is ‘relationship migration’, where individuals move ‘with a partner to consolidate a same-sex 
relationship – or conversely, moving away after relationship breakdown’.15  
Reference to a hegemonic understanding of diaspora is perhaps somewhat overstated, as the concept has been the 
subject of much academic debate, although one could argue that there is now greater consensus as to its key char-
acteristics. The term ‘diaspora’ initially referred exclusively to the scattering of the Jews following their exile in Baby-
lon, before being broadened to include the dispersion inter alia of Greeks, Africans and Armenians and was originally 
                                                 
10  ‘Queer’ is also used to refer to non-cisgender individuals, although trans* migrants are not part of this research.  
11  Martin F. Manalansan, “Queer intersections,” 229. 
12  For an in-depth discussion of queer approaches in sociology, see Steven Seidman, ed, Queer Theory/Sociology (Oxford: 
Wiley, 1996). 
13  Oded Stark and David E. Bloom, “The New Economics of Labor Migration,” American Economic Review, 75 (1985), 173-178. 
14  Andrew Gorman-Murray, “Intimate mobilities,” 443. 
15  Andrew Gorman-Murray, “Intimate mobilities,” 446. 
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understood to constitute the ‘traumatic dispersal from an original homeland and the salience of the homeland in the 
collective memory of a forcibly dispersed group’.16 Accordingly, initial understandings of the concept were associat-
ed with the traumatic wrench from the homeland and ‘a historical experience of victimhood at the hands of a cruel 
oppressor’.17 However, by the early 1990s these key defining characteristics of diaspora were being challenged by 
scholars such as Safran, who argued that the concept could be usefully applied to a broader range of expatriate 
communities, such as labour migrants, colonial migrants and trade migrants, who left their homelands voluntarily. 
This more flexible understanding of diaspora cast the conceptual net much wider than before, resulting in what Co-
hen subsequently referred to a ‘diaspora craze’, whereby the term was applied to a wide range of communities, 
spaces and practices.18 While greater awareness of the analytical benefit of ‘diaspora’ could be seen as an encourag-
ing development, the problem with casting the net so wide is that the concept becomes ‘stretched to the point of 
uselessness. […] If everyone is diasporic, then no one is distinctively so.’19 Brubaker therefore called for the concep-
tualisation of diaspora to be consolidated, insisting that communities would need to meet three criteria if they were 
to be considered diasporas: dispersion, homeland orientation and boundary maintenance.  
Although some academics use diaspora to refer to settled communities living outside of the ethnic homeland as a 
result of shifting borders rather than physical relocation, dispersion is generally accepted as the sine qua non of di-
aspora.20 While there is some disagreement as to whether dispersion should be forced or also voluntary and wheth-
er people have to cross the state frontier or whether they could also be dispersed within the state, there is general 
agreement that members of a diasporic community should be scattered beyond the homeland.  
The role of the homeland orientation in definitions of diaspora is more contentious. For Safran, the existence of di-
aspora is conditional on a very particular relationship with the homeland, one in which the latter is seen inter alia as 
‘the true, ideal home and as the place to which one would (or should) eventually return’.21 The focus on homeland 
orientation and, in particular, on the ‘teleology of return’ have been criticised by many, however, with Clifford point-
                                                 
16  Robin Cohen, Global Diasporas. An Introduction (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), quotation on 4. 
17  Robin Cohen, Global Diasporas, 4. 
18  Robin Cohen, Global Diasporas, 8. 
19  Rogers Brubaker, “The diaspora diaspora,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 28 (2005), 1-9, quotation on 3. 
20  See, for example, M.A. Waterbury, “Internal exclusion, external inclusion: diaspora politics and party-building strategies in 
post-communist Hungary,” East European Politics and Societies, 20 (2006), 483-515. 
21  William Safran, “Diasporas in modern societies,” 83-84. 
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ing out that many members of the African diaspora, for example, would not necessarily know to which homeland 
they should return.22 The same, one could argue, is true of migrants from states such as the Soviet Union, which no 
longer exist. Moreover, it has been argued that focusing on the homeland as the original source of the diaspora rein-
forces its primordial ethnic character and fails to take account of difference within the diaspora along lines of class, 
gender and sexuality, let alone allowing for the possibility of diasporas to be formed around an identity other than 
the ethnic.23 Yet, while we could agree that ‘decentred, lateral connections may be as important as those formed 
around a teleology of origin/return’, the identities underpinning the diaspora still derive, at least in part, from the 
identity of the original homeland.24 While they may be hybrid, hyphenated identities, the culture of the homeland – 
even if it is rejected – remains the key point of reference.25 
Debates about the relative homogeneity or hybridity of diaspora identities also figure in the third of Brubaker’s key 
conditions of diaspora: boundary-maintenance. Whether self-policed as a means to resist assimilation and safeguard 
the migrant community’s original identity or religion, or externally imposed as part of a policy of segregation, main-
taining a clear boundary between the migrant community and the host society is seen as a key condition of diaspora 
existence. Or at least it was in the past. As there is less pressure on migrants today to assimilate fully into the culture 
of the host society and as new technologies and cheap flights enable migrants to maintain inter-personal ties with 
the homeland, however, endogamy and unbending adherence to the cultural practices of the ‘old country’ are no 
longer essential for the survival of the diasporic community. Historical experience has shown that incorporating ele-
ments of other cultures into its own does not signal the demise of a diaspora. The existence of a diaspora is there-
fore conditional not on rigid demarcation but on a sense of difference between the migrant community and the host 
society. As long as diasporas do not assimilate completely, cultural syncretism does not pose the threat to their con-
tinued existence it once did.  
Decentring rigid boundary-maintenance and the teleology of origin/return from the definition of diaspora, while 
nevertheless maintaining a distinct (perhaps hybrid) identity oriented towards the homeland (however understood) 
                                                 
22  J. Clifford, “Diasporas,” Cultural Anthropology, 9 (1994), 302-338, quotation on 305. 
23  Floya Anthias, “Evaluating ‘diaspora’: beyond ethnicity?,” Sociology, 32 (1998), 557-580, quotation on 557. 
24  J. Clifford, “Diasporas,” 305-306. 
25  See Stuart Hall, “Cultural identity and diaspora,” in Identity: Community, Culture, Difference. ed. J. Rutherford, 222-237 (Lon-
don: Lawrence and Wishart, 1990). 
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provides a degree of flexibility in the application of ‘diaspora’ to individual cases, without losing cohesion in its con-
ceptualisation. Moreover, not only are the borders of diasporas not fixed but the idea that all members of a diaspora 
share a single identity is also not credible. When considering the contents of specific identities, it is important to re-
member that they are not given but ‘reflect the perceptions, priorities and aspirations of those people who have the 
power to both construct categories and promote them as natural or superior’.26 What the leaders of a particular di-
asporic community may present as the one true representation of the national culture is therefore unlikely to chime 
with all members of the diaspora. At the very least, individuals will attach different meanings to the shared culture, 
precluding the possibility of a single, unified, shared identification.  
This reconceptualisation allows us to think of ‘diaspora’ not solely as a rigidly-demarcated, bounded community, de-
fined exclusively with reference to an ethnic homeland, with a shared identity and joint interests (although diasporic 
social forms of this kind clearly do exist at the micro level) but rather opens up a space for ‘diaspora’ to be used flex-
ibly and applied to migrant communities defined not solely in ethnic terms, while also recognising that diasporic sub-
jects are diverse inter alia in terms of their age, gender, class, political affiliation and, not least, sexuality.  
The incorporation of sexuality into the study of diaspora has produced a number of works on ‘queer diaspora’, alt-
hough there is no consensus as to how best to understand the concept. Basing their analyses on a comparison with 
the ethno-cultural model and focusing on the scattering of diasporic subjects, sexuality scholars initially dismissed 
the very possibility of its existence as a social form in that it would have ‘no locale from which to wander’.27 Subse-
quent analyses understood the concept more as a form of consciousness, applying it to a feeling of exile, locating 
LGBQ individuals outside the ‘home’ of the heterosexual family or the nation.28 The dispersal here is thus metaphori-
cal, rather than physical. Stripping diaspora of its ethno-cultural content and decentring the original homeland as a 
defining feature, Watney uses queer diaspora to refer to the diasporisation of queer culture and politics, whereby 
queer diaspora is used metaphorically but also implies that the queer diaspora does exist as a social form: 
                                                 
26  Jan Penrose and Richard C. M. Mole, “Nation-states and national identity,” in Handbook of Political Geography, eds. Kevin R. 
Cox, Murray Low and Jennifer Robinson, 271-284 (London: Sage, 2008), quotation on 345. 
27  Michael Warner, “Introduction,” in Fear of a Queer Planet. Queer Politics and Social Theory, ed. Michael Warner, vii-xxxi 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), quotation on xvii. 
28  See David Eng, “Out here and over there: queerness and diaspora in Asian American studies,” Social Text, 15 (1997), 31-52. 
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Unlike the tendency of seventies and eighties lesbian and gay theory to develop overly monolithic no-
tions of identity and cultural politics, the concept of diaspora is suggestive of diversification, of scatter-
ing, fracturing, separate developments, and also, perhaps, a certain glamor. It also suggests something 
of a collective interest, however difficult thus may be to pin down. It implies a complex divided constit-
uency, with varying degrees of power and powerlessness.29 
Problematising the conceptualisation of ‘queer diaspora’ as the diasporisation of queer, Fortier understands it more 
as the queering of diaspora, whereby queer spaces are created ‘within ethnically defined diasporas’ in order to chal-
lenge ‘the heterosexist norms supporting definitions of ethnic diasporas’.30 However the concept is understood, a 
shared motivation of scholars working in this field is to use ‘queer diaspora’ as a heuristic device to think about iden-
tity, belonging and solidarity among sexual minorities in the context of migration.31 Yet, to understand why migra-
tion is often seen as ‘a means of escape and of self-realisation’ in the first place for many queers and specifically my 
interview respondents, we need to understand how homosexuality has been constructed in post-Soviet Russia and 
why attitudes towards sexual minorities have become more negative in recent years. It is to these points I now turn. 
 
Homosexuality and homophobia in Putin’s Russia 
While consenting sexual acts between men were decriminalised by the Duma in 1993, attitudes towards LGBQ indi-
viduals were slow to change and have recently taken a turn for the worse.32 Two decades on, homosexuality is still 
considered by many Russians to be an illness requiring medical treatment or the result of bad upbringing or sexual 
abuse, with only a small minority believing it to be a ‘sexual orientation from birth, which merits the same rights as 
heterosexual orientation’.33 In the years between Putin’s first and third presidencies, the percentage of Russians re-
lating towards gays and lesbians kindly, calmly or with interest has fallen from 47% to 29%, while those relating to 
homosexuals with apprehension, annoyance or disgust has increased from 48% to 65%.34 Even before the introduc-
                                                 
29  Simon Watney, “AIDS and the politics of queer diaspora,” in Negotiating Lesbian and Gay Subjects, eds Monica Dorenkamp 
and Richard Henke, 53-70 (New York and Abingdon: Routledge, 1995), quotation on 59. 
30  Anne-Marie Fortier, “Queer diaspora,” 183. 
31  Anne-Marie Fortier, “Queer diaspora,” in Handbook of Gay and Lesbian Studies, eds Diane Richardson and Steven Seidman, 
183-197 (London: Sage, 2002), quotation on 184. 
32 Consenting sexual acts between adult women had never been specifically criminalised in Russia. 
33  For detailed statistics on public opinion on homosexuality, see ‘Homophobia’, press release of the Levada-Center, at 
http://www.levada.ru/eng/homophobia (accessed 2 September 2015). 
34  ‘Homophobia’, press release of the Levada-Center, at http://www.levada.ru/eng/homophobia (accessed 2 September 2015). 
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tion of the regional and federal laws banning the propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations, researchers found 
that - despite quite vibrant gay scenes in the larger Russian towns and cities35 - few individuals identified themselves 
publicly as gay, lesbian or bisexual and there was little sense of an LGBQ community existing in post-Soviet Russia.36 
As discussed in the introduction to the themed section, sexual minorities were and are generally seen as not belong-
ing and thus not deserving of full sexual citizenship and expected to remain invisible.37 While these processes can be 
traced back to the mid-1990s, it was at the start of Putin’s third presidency in 2011 that a specific conceptualisation 
of gender and sexuality was elevated to an issue of state policy, a process that would have negative consequences 
for sexual minorities.38  
It was the mass protests against the falsification of the results of the 2011 presidential elections which prompted 
Putin to reaffirm his political legitimacy by protecting ‘traditional Russian values’ in the face of alien ideas from the 
West, such as tolerance of homosexuality.39 Following a number of regional bills banning the spreading of ‘propa-
ganda of non-traditional sexual relations’, Putin signed the federal law on 30 June 2013, under the terms of which 
individuals and organisations can be fined for disseminating information about ‘non-traditional sexual orientations’ 
among minors or for promoting ‘the social equivalence of traditional and non-traditional relationships’.40  
Appeals to tradition and ‘the symbolic resource of the collective past’ – legitimised by full support from the Russian 
Orthodox Church – provide Russian politicians with a ‘powerful lever for political mobilisation’ aimed at strengthen-
ing national unity in the face of perceived internal and external enemies.41 According to Wilkinson, homophobia in 
Russia ‘functions as a Slavophile political shorthand for national identity and traditional values’.42 The restriction of 
                                                 
35  Francesca Stella, Lesbian Lives in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 110-125. 
36  See Laurie Essig, Queer in Russia: A Story of Sex, Self and the Other (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999). 
37  Brain J. Baer, “Now you see it: gay (in)visibility and the performance of post-Soviet identity,” in Queer Visibility in Post-
Socialist Cultures, eds N. Fejes and A.P. Balogh, 35-56 (Bristol: Intellect, 2013). 
38  An earlier version of the discussion below was published on reference removed to maintain integrity of the review process. 
39  President of Russia. 2014. Interv’yu rossiyskim i inostranym SMI. [Interview with Russian and Foreign Media.] Website of the 
President of Russia. [Online] [Accessed 07.07.2015] Available from: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20080. 
40  The full text is available on the Rossiyskaya Gazeta Dokumenty website: http://www.rg.ru/2013/06/30/deti-site-dok.html 
[Accessed on 14 July 2015].  
41  Natalia Pecherskaya, “Perspektivy rossiiskoi semejnoi politiki: prinuzhdenie k traditsii [Prospects for Russian family policy: 
The drive towards tradition],” Zhurnal Sotsiologii i Sotsialnoi Antropologii. 69 (2013), 94–105, quotation on 96. 
42  Cai Wilkinson, “Putting “traditional values” into practice: the rise and contestation of anti-homopropaganda laws in Russia,” 
Journal of Human Rights, 13 (2014), 363-379, quotation on 368. 
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gay rights enables Putin to clamp down on actual and potential opponents, deflect attention from political and eco-
nomic problems and shore up support among the conservative majority. To ensure the traditional values/anti-LGBQ 
discourse resonates with Russian society, Putin frames it as part of a strategy to ensure the survival of the Russian 
nation. The survival of the physical nation would need a marked increase in the Russian birth rate and to achieve this 
goal, according to Putin in a television interview in January 2014, Russia has to ‘cleanse’ itself of gay people.43 To re-
inforce its specifically Russian identity, the nation needs to define itself against its main Other, the West – in particu-
lar, the United States and Western Europe – rejecting their liberal values, including support for LGBQ equality.  
While one might infer that the aim of the laws was to render homosexuality invisible, the top-down pressure from 
the state has to some degree inadvertently produced bottom-up counter-pressure in the form of a wave of new or 
renewed activism both within the country and beyond Russia’s borders. The anti-LGBQ legislation has lit a fire under 
many Russian sexual dissidents, although the ability of activists within Russia to counter the homophobic political 
discourse is constrained by the very laws against which they are protesting. Nevertheless, the laws have also brought 
the issue of LGBQ rights in Russia – a topic the authorities sought to suppress – to national and international atten-
tion. The visibility which the legislation has unintentionally produced can thus be seen as an important component 
of resistance to the state-sponsored attempts to make homosexuality invisible in the public sphere.  
Yet, while homosexuality has to some degree remained in the public eye, the othering of and increasingly hostile 
atmosphere for non-heterosexuals have prompted many homosexuals (outside of activist circles) to retreat to the 
private sphere or to gay and lesbian bars and clubs, which offer relatively safe spaces, albeit without ‘the infrastruc-
ture of community to nourish solidarity’.44 As many of the respondents confirmed, however, not even the refuge of 
gay and lesbian bars and clubs was available outside of the major metropoles. Some towns and cities had never had 
an LGBQ venue, while in others they had been forced to close under pressure from the Church. Even if there were 
bars and clubs, access was often mediated by the economic capital of the clientele, making them out of reach for 
many. As Alyosha commented: ‘Gay establishments – the gay industry in general – are usually for well-off people, 
not for the poor.’ Yet, even well-off respondents from major cities, such as St Petersburg, reported that going to gay 
                                                 
43  ‘Putin: Russia must 'cleanse' itself of gays, but they shouldn't fear Sochi’, Aljazeera America, 19 January 2014; 
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/1/19/putin-russia-mustcleanseitselfofgays.html (Accessed on 21 April 2015) 
44  Daniel Healey, “Russia,” glbtq: An Encyclopedia of Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Culture, at 
http://www.glbtqarchive.com/ssh/russia_S.pdf (accessed 3 September 2015), 11. 
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and lesbian clubs ran the risk of violence at the hands of both criminals and the police and was thus often avoided, 
with individuals preferring to make friends through personal contacts or on the Internet.  
Outside of the ‘safe haven’ of the home or LGBQ establishments, the behaviour of respondents was thus constrained 
by fear of being identified as homosexual in the heterosexually coded public space. As Alyosha explained: ‘I can’t be 
seen on the street with a gay man. Although I can see that he’s gay, I can’t make friends with him or chat to him, be-
cause people would start to look at me. They would start to talk.’ In general, what emerged from the data was that 
the ability to live one’s life without fear of discrimination or physical violence largely depended on one’s ability to 
remain invisible within society’s heteronormative structures. For those who ‘do not look gay by Russian standards’, 
to cite Boris, the ability ‘to pass’ made life easier. For those unable to do so, even if they were not out to anyone, life 
was more difficult: ‘It wasn't ever possible to tell anyone. […] But you can tell that I am gay, I can't hide it, it's my na-
ture. What am I supposed to do?’ (Alyosha). 
At some point in their lives, sexual minorities generally have to consider ‘what they are supposed to do’ – how they 
should respond to situations in which they are constructed as not fitting within society, as being ‘out of place’ – in 
ways that heterosexuals generally do not. The range of available responses is, of course, broad and culturally and 
historically contingent. One could argue that for sexual dissidents who do not wish to remain invisible in the public 
sphere (itself a choice that not all LGBQ people will wish to make or consider appropriate) or feel unable to remain 
invisible in the public sphere even if they wanted to, the basic response is one of ‘exit’ or ‘voice’ to use Hirschman’s 
classic paradigm.45 In view of the fact that the regional and federal laws banning ‘propaganda of non-traditional sex-
ual relations’ have sought to stifle the voice of protesters, the decision to exit the homeland and move abroad has 
been an increasingly popular one. However, ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ must not be understood as mutually exclusive respons-
es; rather, the former often leads to the latter. Indeed, it was as a result of migration to Berlin that many LGBQ Rus-
sians took part in co-ordinated protest activity against the government in Russia for the first time. As I will show lat-
er, this co-ordinated protest activity with activists in Russia was, I argue, facilitated by the sense of identity, belong-
ing and solidarity fostered by the Russian queer diaspora in Berlin. 
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Queer migration: moving to Berlin 
While the Western media often give the impression that gays and lesbians in the ‘illiberal East’ are forced to migrate 
to the ‘liberal West’ due to the intolerance towards homosexuality in their home societies, the picture painted by my 
respondents was far more complex.46 While sexuality did play a role in the migration decisions of almost all respond-
ents, it was not always the primary motivating factor. Indeed, migration was not the preferred option for everyone 
and migration was not always expected to be permanent, even among those who did move to Berlin for reasons re-
lating to their sexuality, which was not the case for all my respondents.  
To Gorman-Murray, as discussed above, if migration by LGBQ migrants is not specifically motivated by issues related 
to sexuality, it is not queer migration. In his understanding of queer migration, Gorman-Murray therefore suggests a 
one-way relationship between sexuality and migration, with the former influencing the latter. However, I argue that 
queer migration should be understood as a more dynamic, two-way process, whereby the experience of migration 
can also influence sexuality – the way it is understood, performed and experienced. If migration is ‘embodied dis-
placement’, as Gorman-Murray rightly suggests, queer migration should be understood as the displacement of queer 
bodies – whatever their motivation for migrating – and encompass a range of experiences, behaviours and feelings 
shared by queer migrants in contexts of displacement.47  
In terms of destination, the choice of Germany by most respondents was largely determined by their ability to ac-
quire German citizenship or residency. Three routes to citizenship or residency were identified. Firstly, Germany of-
fers preferential treatment in the acquisition of citizenship rights to migrants who are descended from the Germans 
who moved to Russia in the eighteenth century at the invitation of Catherine the Great. Spätaussiedler have enjoyed 
this legal right since 1953.48 Secondly, since 1991, Jews from the former Soviet Union have also enjoyed the right to 
                                                 
46  See “Gay Russians are seeking asylum in the United States because of anti-gay hostility and attacks in their homeland,” Daily 
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The Guardian, 1 July 2007: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jul/01/gayrights.uk (accessed on 16 June 2012). 
47  Andrew Gorman-Murray, “Intimate mobilities,” 445, emphasis added. 
48  See the German Federal Law on Refugees and Exiles [in German]: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bvfg/index.html (Ac-
cessed on 21 November 2015). 
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migrate to Germany and obtain residence subject to their meeting certain conditions.49 (The emergence of the Rus-
sian-speaking diaspora in Berlin as a result of the initial waves of German-Russian and Jewish migration is discussed 
below.) All other migrants from the post-Soviet space have no automatic entitlement to move to Germany and thus 
need to obtain student or working visas. As such, unless they have German or Jewish heritage, LGBQ migrants from 
the former Soviet Union need high cultural or economic capital to enter and remain legally in Germany, thus pre-
cluding those without the necessary education or financial resources. These three pathways to citizenship or resi-
dency map onto the three main social groups to which my respondents belonged: German-Russians; Russian-
speaking Jews; and Russian businesspeople and students. 
The choice of Berlin as a specific destination within Germany was based on a range of factors. First, the city was seen 
as being ‘more friendly towards immigrants’ than other German cities and, because of the ethnic mix, ‘you don’t feel 
like a foreigner’ (Boris), whereas other respondents found Munich, for example, to be ‘too German’ (Masha). Due, in 
part, to its multicultural character, Berlin is also known for being open to difference. As Zoya explained: ‘The liberal-
ism and individuality of a city; it allows you to live your life on your own terms, much more so than in a small town. 
For me, Berlin is unique in Germany, it’s different, much freer.’ Both the freedom and openness to difference were 
repeatedly mentioned with particular reference to sexuality. This related in part to the LGBQ scene in Berlin, which 
was a pull factor for a number of respondents, but more often to the relaxed attitudes of Berliners towards LGBQ 
people, in general. As Boris recounts: 
 
When I was in Russia, I had my own firm and earned enough to go travelling. I saw many countries and 
saw how people lived and how other societies treat gay people. ... Therefore I set myself the goal of liv-
ing in a city, in a country, where you don't have to hide your orientation, you don't have to be afraid of 
anything and where you can be who you want to be. That's why I moved here [Berlin]. 
 
While the above factors would potentially be a pull for all LGBQ migrants, it was the specific history of Berlin that 
acted as an additional draw for some of the migrants from the former USSR. For Masha it was the Soviet influence 
on the architecture and urban landscape of Berlin that appealed, that provided a sense of familiarity: ‘As I’ve always 
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said, Berlin has so much of my past in it.’ For Zoya, it had more to do with the fusion of the city’s Eastern and West-
ern character, which reflected her identification with both the East and the West: 
 
It’s the unbelievably unique character of this city that was divided and then joined together. I like that. 
Growing up in Russia and moving to Western Europe […] there was this huge rift between two worlds. 
And in Berlin I have somehow been able to bring these two worlds together, so that they are no longer 
in opposition. 
 
As discussed above, in terms of motivation, the academic literature suggests that the main reason for migrating is 
economic: individuals move to boost their wages and gain work experience.50 For many LGBQ migrants, however, 
economic considerations are a secondary consideration, if they are considered at all. While it would be incorrect to 
say that economic factors played no role in the migration decision of my respondents in that some used their eco-
nomic capital to finance their move to Germany, only one respondent stipulated that he had migrated with the spe-
cific aim of improving his career prospects. Two of my respondents owned their own businesses in Russia and Ka-
zakhstan, respectively, and reported that they earned a good living. According to neo-classical economic theories of 
migration, they would have been better off staying at home; yet, they chose to move to Germany. For all but two of 
the respondents who had migrated as adults, i.e. not as children with their parents, the decision to move abroad had 
been motivated at least in part by their sexuality. It is important to stress, however, that sexuality was not always 
the primary reason, as Vladimir explains: 
 
There were a number of reasons at that time why I wanted to move abroad, not necessarily to Germa-
ny, but abroad. Of course, one reason was my sexual identity. There were also other reasons that were 
also important. So my sexual identity and my coming out weren’t the main reasons.  
 
In terms of specific motivations, for most respondents migration was ‘a means of escape and of self-realisation’ to 
quote Binnie.51 While one respondent came to Germany as an asylum-seeker, fleeing Kazakhstan in fear for his life, 
for the others the decision to migrate was not driven by the need to escape physical violence, as their invisibility, 
                                                 
50  Stark and Bloom, “The New Economics of Labor Migration.” 
51  Jon Binnie, “Invisible Europeans: sexual citizenship in the New Europe,” Environment and Planning A, 29 (1997), 237-248, 
quotation on 240. 
15 
restriction to the private sphere or their economic capital largely shielded them from potential attack.52 Rather, they 
chose to leave their homelands to escape the heteronormative mechanisms of social control in order to live their 
lives openly and enjoy rights denied to them at home due to their sexual orientation. This desire for sexual citizen-
ship rights must then be added to Gorman-Murray’s three-part classification of motivations for queer migration, dis-
cussed above.53 
Prior to emigrating, less than one third of my respondents had come out and, of those who were out, very few were 
out to their families. Fear of their parents’ reactions and/or fear of trouble at work or college prevented them from 
being open about their sexual orientation with anyone other than their closest friends. Boris’s case was typical: ‘The 
only people who knew I was gay were gay themselves. My colleagues didn't know I was gay, my parents didn't know 
I was gay, my straight friends didn't know I was gay.’ For Ivan, who lived at home with his parents in a small village, 
the choice he faced – if he decided to stay in Russia – was between coming out and possibly losing his family or stay-
ing in the closet and maintaining a relationship with his parents. Migration offered him the opportunity to come out 
and live his life as a gay man, without his parents finding out: ‘My family is important to me, so I couldn’t [come out 
at home], that wasn’t possible. It was only after I moved to Cologne [before then moving to Berlin] that I started to 
live for myself, that I started to live.’  
It is important to stress, however, that moving abroad was not always the respondents’ first choice, that for some 
staying in their home country would have been preferred. As Zoya explained, her main aim was for her and her girl-
friend to escape the social pressure of their provincial home town, which they hoped could be achieved by means of 
internal migration: 
 
We were feeling pressure from society, on the one side, and pressure from our families, acquaintances, 
colleagues, friends of our parents. There was a lot of pressure from the family. In a large city, you can 
simply move to another part of town. But living in a small town – that’s difficult. We wanted to live to-
gether. So our idea was simply to move to St. Petersburg. 
 
                                                 
52  For a photographic representation of gay men who fled Russia and sought asylum in the United States on the grounds of 
their sexual orientation, see Alexander Kargaltsev, Asylum (New York, 2012).  
53  Andrew Gorman-Murray, “Intimate mobilities,” 446. 
16 
While migration to a Russian metropolis with at least some LGBQ establishments provided a space to meet other 
LGBQ people and possibly ‘explore bodily sexual desires’, it is difficult to consider this a case of ‘gravitational group 
migration’ in the sense Gorman-Murray uses it in that the ‘community belonging’ and ‘sense of ease in performing 
embodied sexualities’ – at least in the public sphere – were missing from my respondents’ accounts of LGBQ life in 
post-Soviet metropolitan spaces.54  
An additional frequently mentioned motivation for migrating was to be able to live with one’s partner, with the as-
sumption being that ‘attitudes towards same-sex couples would be better’ (Polina) in Germany. For a number of re-
spondents, one partner had succeeded in using their cultural capital to obtain a scholarship to study at a university 
in Germany, which enabled them to support the immigration of the other. However, it is important to point out that 
not all respondents intended to stay away from Russia permanently, as was the case with Zoya. As she went on to 
explain, it was only once she and her partner had lived in Germany for a while that she became aware of the differ-
ences between the two countries in terms of being able to live one’s life openly, subsequently making it more diffi-
cult to leave: ‘Once you have tasted this freedom, you do not want to lose it.’ This point was also made by others, 
such as Polina, who linked this sense of freedom to greater legal rights, acknowledging that it was in Berlin that she 
first understood she, as a lesbian, had rights, just like everyone else. While sexual citizenship rights were not specifi-
cally mentioned as pull factors by many other respondents, however, a number of them had entered into civil part-
nerships and/or adopted their same-sex partners’ children, rights that would have been unavailable to them in their 
home countries. The differences between Germany and Russia came into even sharper relief for those, such as Leo-
nid and Darya, who lived transnational lives between Germany and Russia. For Darya, it had been the stress of ‘living 
normally here in Berlin’ but ‘not having a private life’ when working in Russia that eventually prompted her to move 
to Berlin permanently. Therefore, even for those for whom their sexuality was not a key reason to leave, it was often 
a key reason to stay, as confirmed by Olga: ‘I would say that [my sexuality] played perhaps a subconscious role in my 
decision to migrate, but in my decision to stay here – absolutely.’ 
 
Queer diaspora: renegotiating Russian-ness 
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While the general impression given by my respondents – even those who were not initially keen to move to Germa-
ny or did not move for reasons related to their sexuality – was that they felt greater freedom to perform their sexu-
ality and develop relationships with other non-heterosexuals in Berlin than in their home countries, it was also clear 
that the communities of belonging which LGBQ migrants seek out are not defined exclusively with relation to sexual 
orientation. Despite the political attempts to construct homosexuality and Russian national identity as being mutual-
ly exclusive, it was apparent from the interviews that Russian-ness – particularly with reference to Russian language, 
culture and mentality – was a central part of the sense of self of almost all my respondents.  
It is important to stress that the respondents’ identification with Russian-ness was not necessarily predicated upon 
their being ethnically Russian; this appeared particularly to have been the case with non-Russian Slavs and for mem-
bers of ethnic groups which did not have an eponymous Soviet republic or were geographically dispersed across the 
territory of the USSR. The USSR’s policy of requiring all citizens to learn Russian and the frequent conflation of Soviet 
and Russian culture produced subjects who often considered themselves culturally Russian, even if they were ethni-
cally Ukrainian, Belarusian, Jewish, German, etc. As Katya, who was born and brought up in Ukraine, explained with 
reference to the mixing and blurring of her Ukrainian and Russian heritage: ‘Well, I was born in the Soviet Union, so 
there was never a specific distinction between Ukraine and Russia’. At the same time, respondents recognised that 
their sense of Russian-ness was often just one of a ‘palette of identities’ which changed as their ‘priorities changed’ 
(Darya). Nevertheless, while many had been acculturated into a range of identity groups and could therefore func-
tion unproblematically in a range of cultural contexts, all but one resisted completely losing their sense of Russian-
ness, which was understood to shape ‘the way I’m thinking, the way I’m talking, the behaviour, the values’, to quote 
Evgeniy.  
The ability to speak Russian with other native-speakers was identified by respondents as particularly important. For 
Sonya, it played an important role in shaping her self-identification as Russian, despite neither of her parents being 
ethnically Russian. While for some the desire to speak Russian was related more to their inability to communicate 
very well in German in the initial post-migration period, for others it had more to do with the comfort of ‘switching 
off your brain’ (Yuriy) or being able to use language in a more sophisticated manner than would be the case with 
German. It is, of course, important to remember that language is not simply a functional means of communication 
but moreover conveys a wealth of meanings and cultural references. Together, Russian-speakers can share jokes, 
without having to provide context. The Russian language thus provided a ‘common denominator’ for many of the 
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respondents, enabling individuals from different parts of the former USSR, for example, to reminisce about their 
childhoods, the children’s TV shows they used to watch and the songs they used to sing. As Olga recalled: ‘It does 
not matter if you are from Uzbekistan or Russia, you all had the same two TV channels and sang the same songs.’  
This shared socialisation into the norms of Soviet society also produced what was frequently referred to as a ‘Russian 
mentality’, an important aspect of Russian-ness that distinguished them from Germans. A key aspect of this mentali-
ty was the perception that Russians are governed more ‘by emotion than reason’ (Galina) and that they take more of 
an interest in others than do other nationalities. While in extemis this could be seen as a problem, as Russians ‘tend 
to stick their noses in everywhere’ (Masha), it was generally understood as the desire of Russians to make a personal 
connections with others and was thus seen as a factor enhancing well-being and a sense of belonging. Indeed, the 
perceived standoffishness of Germans was seen by some, such as Galina, as a cause of feelings of isolation: ‘Initially, 
I tried really hard to integrate into this society but, for some reason, it was difficult. I found them [Germans] not as 
warm-hearted as Russians. Perhaps, that is just a stereotype but I found it to be true.’ For Olga, the fear that the 
freedom that Berlin offered to LGBQ migrants could potentially be offset by a sense of loneliness were she to leave 
behind her Russian-speaking friends and family weighed on her decision as to whether she should migrate at all: 
 
I must admit that there was a thought somewhere in the back of my mind: when I am in Berlin, I will be 
free for the first time in my life to do whatever I want … if I go. Because I had the feeling that I would be 
completely alone. I am the only one like this – especially among Russian-speakers.  
 
What the above discussion shows is that sexual identity is not the only identity that is important to LGBQ migrants  
and that national identity plays a key role in their self-identification, their ability to make sense of the world as well 
as their personal well-being. Moreover, Russian-ness was not understood as an individual sense of self, which could 
be sustained on one’s own, but rather as emerging out of interaction with others. In attempting to maintain a sense 
of national identity in the post-migration context, migrants thus often seek out people of their own ethno-cultural 
background in the destination society. In this context, diasporas play an important role in that they often ‘mobilise a 
collective identity’, thereby creating a sense of community and solidarity with co-ethnic members within and across 
state boundaries, and provide economic, social and psychological support.55 As discussed above, I argue that ‘diaspo-
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ra’ must be understood as both a social form and a form of consciousness, critiquing the traditional conceptualisa-
tion as a rigidly-demarcated, bounded community, defined exclusively with reference to an ethnic homeland and 
with a shared identity and joint interests. Below I assess the extent to which a cohesive Russian-speaking diaspora 
community in Berlin can be said to exist and whether the latter provided a sense of identity, solidarity and belonging 
for the LGBQ migrants.  
Germany is home to the largest population of Russian-speakers outside of the former USSR. Precise figures are una-
vailable, however; as soon as they are granted German citizenship (for which Spätaussiedler and Jews from the for-
mer Soviet Union are given preferential treatment), they are not counted as anything other than German in official 
statistics. However, it is known that over 1.5 million ethnic Germans from the former Soviet republics emigrated to 
Germany between 1992 and 2007, with some 100,000 Jews arriving during the nineties.56 It is estimated that around 
300,000 Russian-speakers live in Berlin alone, with the largest concentration found in Marzahn-Hellersdorf, a socially 
disadvantaged district in the East of the city.57 The earliest Spätaussiedler were provided with apartments by the au-
thorities in the housing estates on the edge of the city, while later waves of German-Russians who had to make their 
own arrangements also headed to Marzahn-Hellersdorf as they ‘preferred living among their compatriots’.58 Ethno-
graphic researchers found that in this residential enclave the German-Russians lived closely together in ‘vertical vil-
lages, high-rise buildings completely settled by immigrants of one national origin’, where Russian remained the dom-
inant language of communication and a range of restaurants, businesses and cultural venues catered to the sizeable 
Russian-speaking population.59 Ethnic density together with the existence of ethnic commercial and cultural spaces 
are generally the sine qua non for the development of a diaspora community as a social form, enabling members to 
speak their language, perform their culture and maintain the collective identity – or, at least, a specific conceptuali-
sation of the collective identity. Research into various diaspora communities has demonstrated that, as a strategy 
aimed at avoiding assimilation into the host society, the former often promote a more traditional understanding of 
the shared identity, norms and values – especially regarding gender and sexuality – than is the case in the homeland 
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they left behind.60 This is particularly true if there is limited integration and rigid boundary-maintenance on the part 
of the diaspora, which, according to a number of my respondents, is the case with many Russian-speakers in Berlin. 
As Vladimir suggests: ‘There are many Russian Jews and many German-Russians and they are very closed communi-
ties.’ As Galina argues, by ‘living in ghettos’ and ‘only mixing with other Marzahn Russians’, the Russian-speaking mi-
grants can live their lives as if they never left Russia: ‘I can only imagine that the older generation think they are still 
there.’ Given that attitudes towards sexual minorities in Russia and other post-Soviet states are generally negative, 
Russian-speaking migrants often bring their ‘Soviet experiences, attitudes and prejudices regarding homosexuality’ 
with them to Germany.61 While research has shown that migration can under certain conditions liberalise attitudes 
towards homosexuality, this is less likely to be the case if there is limited integration into the host society.62 This was 
the experience of Katya, who had migrated to Germany as a child with her family. After migrating, the family only 
ever watched Russian TV and read the Russian press, only spoke Russian, had little contact with Germans and their 
circle of acquaintance was limited to ‘compatriots’, as she put it. When she came out to her family, the attitudes to-
wards homosexuality they had imported from the former Soviet Union resulted in their cutting off all contact with 
her. Alyosha, an asylum-seeker, was wary of coming across other Russians, for similar reasons: 
 
I wasn’t afraid of foreigners, I wasn’t afraid of people from Ethiopia or from Iran, because they have 
their culture and I have mine. […] I was very afraid of Russian-speakers, that they would come up to    
me and ask me: who are you, what are you, are you gay or not gay, what are you doing here? 
 
While not all migrants are necessarily keen to be part of their ethno-cultural diaspora community, they may still de-
fine their identities with reference to the ethnic homeland and visit diasporic spaces to enjoy their national culture, 
traditions and cuisines, i.e. they have a ‘diaspora consciousness’.63 Yet, even for those who sought to limit their in-
volvement with the diaspora to visiting diasporic spaces, the latter were felt by a number of respondents to be un-
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welcoming to LGBQ people, or the form of representation of Russian-ness being propagated was unappealing. Vla-
dimir stopped visiting ‘traditional restaurants, where there are Russians and only Russians’, for example, as he was 
made to feel unwelcome because of his sexuality. Similarly, Boris only ever attended one ‘Day of Russian Culture’ (an 
annual event, comprising Russia-related talks, films and art exhibitions) because of the behaviour of the members of 
the ethno-cultural diaspora: ‘It reminds me of the Russia I left behind. Drunk, uncivilised people, swearing – exactly 
what I wanted to escape from.’ Other respondents, such as Darya, objected to the very traditional and fixed under-
standing of Russian-ness propagated by the Russian Embassy and Russia House, which failed to take account of more 
alternative cultural perspectives: 
 
What the Embassy and Russia House do in terms of culture is so absolute. This is authentic Russian cul-
ture. […] It’s true that there are Goethe Institutes in other countries and they propagate German culture 
but it’s not just Goethe and Schiller but much more. It is more varied. 
 
While the interviews revealed that almost all respondents were keen to maintain a sense of Russian-ness as part of 
an ethno-cultural community, the Russian ethno-cultural diaspora and diasporic spaces in Berlin were perceived to 
be unappealing or unwelcoming for those identifying as LGBQ. Problematising the idea that shared ethno-cultural 
identity is sufficient to create a sense of ‘we’ feeling within the diaspora community as a whole, the pre-existing Rus-
sian diasporic ethnoscape did not meet the need among the respondents for queer-friendly spaces. It was recogni-
tion of the fact that being ‘a migrant and LGBT’ could lead to ‘double discrimination’ (Polina) that prompted the es-
tablishment of Quarteera, an association of LGBT Russian-speakers and their friends. The aims of Quarteera are to 
act as an organisation to represent the interests of Russian-speaking gays and lesbians in Berlin, to counteract the 
homophobia in the Russian ethno-cultural diaspora, to provide a space to discuss personal problems relating to sex-
uality, protest against the homophobic policies of the Russian government and to support LGBT activists in Russia.64 
In this sense, it could be understood simply as a social movement. However, if we are to understand the affective 
appeal of Quarteera to its members, the role it plays as a specifically Russian space, the social and psychological 
support it offers it members, the desire of its members to change the socio-political situation in Russia and the sense 
of solidarity they feel towards LGBQ people in the ‘homeland’, I argue that we need to recognise Quarteera as a 
form of ‘queer diaspora’, albeit a form that challenges existing conceptualisations in the academic literature. 
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While understanding queer diaspora as the diasporisation of queer culture and politics is a useful way of conceptual-
ising transnational networks of LGBQ political activists – among whose number Quarteera has many – ‘privileging 
sexuality’, rather than ethnicity, as the ‘primary “identity” throughout the diaspora’ runs the risk, for example, of 
Western/non-Western hierarchies being produced within the supposedly ethno-neutral global queer diaspora.65 This 
was the experience of one Quarteera member’s co-operation with a German LGBT organisation, which attempted to 
teach him how to do activism, despite his many years of fighting for LGBT rights in Russia. While Fortier’s under-
standing of queer diaspora as ‘the creation of queer spaces within ethnically defined diasporas’ in the context of 
Russian-speaking LGBQ in Berlin would apply to diaspora as a form of consciousness, it assumes a willingness on the 
part of the ethno-cultural diaspora as a social form to create a space for non-heterosexuals, which is not necessarily 
the case.66 For this reason, I argue that ‘queer diaspora’ is better understood as a community of migrants as a social 
form, united by shared sexual as well as ethno-cultural identities, which operates not necessarily within but also out-
side (or largely outside) the larger ethno-culturally defined diaspora. 
The benefit of understanding Quarteera as a form of queer diaspora will become clear, when we examine the roles 
that it plays in terms of providing social and psychological support to the Russian-speaking LGBQ community in Ber-
lin as well as solidarity with other LGBQs in the post-Soviet space. Firstly, it provides a space where non-heterosexual 
Russian-speakers can meet other non-heterosexual Russian-speakers and are free to perform their sexual identities 
in a specifically Russian-speaking environment. As Leonid reminisced: ‘Only in the past two years, thanks to the peo-
ple who organised Quarteera, do I have Russian friendships that are stable. And in part this has to do with the ability 
to be open [about my sexuality].’ For Katya, Quarteera offered the psychological support of community she needed 
after her family disowned her after she came out to them. Having gone through this experience, she felt a sense of 
responsibility to others in the same situation. While there are various German organisations and support networks 
aimed at LGBQ individuals, they lack the affective appeal of Quarteera. As Olga explained, Russian-speaking ‘individ-
uals and their families can go and receive support’ from people who not only speak Russian but also understand the 
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socio-cultural factors underlying the conflict; due to the linguistic and cultural specificities of the Russian-speaking 
community, ‘these people cannot be helped in a ‘normal’ German-speaking association’.  
Quarteera is also active in protesting against the situation for LGBQ people in Russia and other post-Soviet states. 
Analysing its actions through the prism of ‘queer diaspora’ helps us understand how the shared sexual and ethno-
cultural identity, oriented towards the (former) homeland, facilitates its ability ‘to make claims, articulate projects, 
to formulate expectations, to mobilise energies, to appeal to loyalties’ among Russian-speaking queer migrants in 
Berlin.67 Likewise, the participation of Quarteera in a Rainbow FlashMob, whereby individuals simultaneously release 
rainbow-coloured balloons in towns and cities across the world to mark the International Day against Homophobia 
and Transphobia, was understood by Zoya as ‘an action of solidarity’ with LGBT people in various post-Soviet states. 
While many of the LGBQ Russian-speakers were part of a globalised queer politics, taking part in protests against the 
LGBT rights situation in Russia and other post-Soviet states, this feeling of solidarity with LGBQ Russians derived as 
much from their shared ethno-cultural identity as their shared sexual identity. 
 
Conclusion 
The above discussion constitutes one of the few empirically grounded analyses of cross-border migration by LGBQ 
individuals in Europe. On the basis of extensive fieldwork in the form of participant observation and in-depth inter-
views, the article furthers our understanding of queer migration by analysing the motivations and migration strate-
gies of LGBQ Russian-speakers in Berlin as well as their attempts to maintain and perform their identities, and seek 
out communities of belonging in the post-migration context. It challenges the dominant neo-classical economic ex-
planation for migration and highlights the importance of incorporating sexuality as an explanatory factor in the deci-
sions of non-heterosexuals to move abroad. Contrary to assumptions made by the Western media about East Euro-
pean gays and lesbians desperate to flee the ‘illiberal East’ for the ‘liberal West’, however, the research also identi-
fied feelings of ambivalence and resistance among some respondents about their decision to move abroad, despite 
the differences in legal rights for and social attitudes towards sexual minorities in the post-Soviet space and Germa-
ny. The article also challenges existing understandings of queer migration that posit a one-way relationship between 
sexuality and migration, with the former influencing the latter, in favour of a more dynamic interplay between the 
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two concepts. Queer migration, I argue, is better understood as the movement of queer bodies through space, en-
compassing a range of experiences, behaviours and feelings shared by queer migrants in contexts of displacement, 
even if sexuality was not a motivating factor in their decision to move abroad.  
My findings also suggest that sexual identity is not the only identity that is important to LGBQ migrants and that –  
despite political attempts to construct non-heterosexuals as being outside the nation – national identity can play a 
key role in their self-identification, their ability to make sense of the world as well as their personal well-being, chal-
lenging the idea that queers in contexts of displacement feel no attachment to their national homelands. The inter-
play between sexuality and migration helps us understand queer migrants’ attempts to seek out communities of be-
longing defined in ethno-national to ‘mobilise a collective identity’, create a sense of community and solidarity with 
co-ethnic members within and across state boundaries, and provide economic, social and psychological support. It is 
thus to the development of our understanding of the interplay between diasporic and sexual identities that the arti-
cle makes a particular contribution.  
Without suggesting that all diasporic communities are unwelcoming to the LGBQ members of their communities, my 
findings suggest that, if there is limited integration or rigid boundary-maintenance on the part of the ethno-national 
diaspora (which, according to a number of my respondents, is the case with many Russian-speakers in Berlin), it will 
be very difficult for queer migrants to find a space in the pre-existing diasporic ethnoscape. The experience of my 
respondents demonstrated that the shared homeland orientation and sense of Russian-ness were insufficient to 
create a sense of ‘we’ feeling within the diaspora community as a whole in that the latter was perceived as unwel-
coming or unappealing to many LGBQ Russophones.  
Recognition that LGBQ migrants risked being doubly marginalised – as ethnic minorities within the host society and 
sexual minorities within the co-ethnic diasporic community – prompted the creation of Quarteera. While it could be 
described simply as a social movement, the role Quarteera plays as a forum for performing and maintaining both 
sexual and ethno-cultural identities, its provision of social and psychological support to its members, its orientation 
towards the post-Soviet homeland and the feelings of solidarity it expresses towards other Russian-speaking queers 
have an affective quality that can best be understood with reference to diaspora. Problematising the traditional un-
derstanding of diaspora solely as a rigidly-demarcated, bounded community, defined exclusively with reference to 
an ethnic homeland, with a shared identity and joint interests, my findings thus showed that diaspora can be used 
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flexibly and applied to migrant communities defined not exclusively in ethnic terms but also defined with reference 
to sexuality.  
While I argue in favour of the potential benefit of using ‘queer diaspora’ as a heuristic device to think about identity, 
belonging and solidarity among sexual minorities in the context of dispersal, I critique the conceptualisation of queer 
diaspora as the diasporisation of ethno-culturally neutral queer communities, as emptying the queer diaspora of its 
ethno-cultural content weakens the latter’s affective appeal and runs the risk of reproducing Western/non-Western 
hierarchies. At the same time, understanding ‘queer diaspora’ as ‘the creation of queer spaces within ethnically de-
fined diasporas’ assumes a willingness on the part of ethno-cultural diaspora to create a space for non-heterosexu-
als, which is not necessarily the case.68 For this reason, this research calls for the concept of ‘queer diaspora’ to be 
rethought of as a community of migrants as a social form, united by shared sexual as well as ethno-cultural identi-
ties, which operates not necessarily within but also outside (or largely outside) the larger ethno-culturally defined 
diaspora. In this connection, a potential benefit of ethno-cultural queer diasporas to be explored in future research 
relates to their ability to minimise Western homonationalism, i.e.  ‘the use of ‘acceptance’ and ‘tolerance’ for gay 
and lesbian subjects as the barometer by which the legitimacy of and capacity for national sovereignty is evaluat-
ed’.69 If ‘Western’ criticism of the situation in Russia is by individuals and groups of the same ethno-cultural commu-
nity, it would thus limit the potential for Western/non-Western hierarchies to be constructed. 
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